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  n Lévi-Strauss’s distinction of hot and 
cold societies, when it comes to the ques-
tion of the causation of the divergences, 
the different strands of analysis all point 
  to one specific phenomenon. In non-li- 
terate, so-called “primitive”, non-civilized 
or non-industrial societies, interpersonal communication 
is more proximate and more immediate than in modern 
societies where, by contrast, relationships between indi-
viduals in literally every sphere of modern social life – 
whether interpersonal, administrative, or political – are 
intermediate rather than immediate, in as much as they 
are at least mediated through written documents.
Our relationship with our own past is a similarly indi-
rect and mediated experience, accessed through the 
written archive and administrative machinery, which 
undoubtedly vastly extend our contacts but at the same 
time, unlike a living oral tradition, give those contacts 
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some kind of “inauthenticity”1. And the extension of the 
mass media has only added to the catastrophic loss of 
autonomy experienced by the modern individual. So if 
society would be defined as a system of communication, 
then Lévi-Strauss’s diagnosis of modern industrial society 
is that it is characterized by a pathology of communica-
tion. More specifically, the modes of technological devel-
opment and historical consciousness which Lévi-Strauss 
takes to be responsible for the destructive expansion of 
Western civilization are impossible without the defining 
technology of writing2.
In the celebrated chapter of Tristes Tropiques on the 
‘writing lesson’, Lévi-Strauss described the violent irrup-
tion of writing in Nambikwara society. When the Nam-
bikwara chief crudely mimicked the act of writing, imitat-
ing the ethnographer recording his notes, it was for dis-
covering by the same token its function of subjugation. 
The ‘writing lesson’ became then the target of Derrida’s 
‘violence of the letter’4, that classic reading with a no less 
classic verbosity, which attached such a great impor-
tance to the least alleged disproportion between factual 
certainties and their interpretive reconsiderations, and 
claimed to reveal Lévi-Strauss’s purported inconsisten-
cies and contradictions, whatever they might be.
Lévi-Strauss’s treatment of writing, using the case of 
Nambikwara mimicry as symptomatic, both enhanced 
and undermined his case for anthropology as an inclusive 
science. It enhanced it through showing that the imposi-
tion of written language is coincident with hierarchization 
and other shortcomings of modernity or “hot” society. It 
subverted it by providing a route for free-floating philo-
1  Claud Lévi-Strauss, 1958, pp. 400-401[66].
2  Claud Lévi-Strauss, 1961, pp. 28-29[26-27].
  Claud Lévi-Strauss, 1955, pp. 9-45 [296-00].
4  J. Derrida, 1967, pp. 149-24 [101-140].91
sophical speculation of the genus post-structuralism and 
postmodernism that ignores the broader anthropologi-
cal project. In this respect, in my revisiting of Derrida’s 
now classic reading of Lévi-Strauss on writing, I argued 
against most post-modern commentators and critics 
that this influential reading has got it wrong, that it has 
misrepresented Lévi-Strauss’s epistemological enterprise 
and his humanistic mission5.
Many of Derrida’s arguments on this point do not 
hold up to a close analysis, and I tried to tease out the 
inconsistencies and show that Lévi-Strauss’s position 
on this, as on most other things, is far more complicat-
ed and nuanced than the version of it that Derrida pre-
sented. In this debate Lévi-Strauss has been quite oddly 
and undeservedly accused variously of being unethical in 
his fieldwork, of failure to subject his material to analy-
sis, of ethnocentrism, subjectivism, empiricism, truism, 
archaism, primitivist utopia, epigenetism, sloppy think-
ing, non-sense, theology and metaphysics – in short, of 
everything that is at odds with what normally stands as 
Lévi-Straussian analysis.
Lévi-Strauss and Jacques Derrida
5  Albert Doja, 2006a.92
In a central period in anthropological history, when 
in Lévi-Strauss’s hand the mental and the material were 
granted equal space, there was a strong programmatic 
claim for an expansive scientific approach, but the render-
ing of that problematic was restricted as other brands of 
structuralism came to dominate the centre stage. Eventu-
ally, as I showed elsewhere6, the debate must be situated 
in its intellectual context of the struggle for the academic 
division of labour in the ‘post-modern cultural condition’. 
This perhaps marks the beginning of the controversy on 
Derrida’s writing/violence episode, in the absence of the 
very subject of this controversy, for I believe that making 
a case, as I did, for the inadequacy of Derrida’s argument 
may also go someway toward recovering Lévi-Strauss 
from the undeserved intellectual obsolescence he seems 
to have been consigned to since then.
It is perhaps not surprisingly that the analytical phi-
losophers have considered Derrida to be the high priest 
of post-modern irrationalism. They were dismissive of his 
work, in part because they believed that he had aban-
doned the very notion that language could be related to 
the world. A spectacular case in point is the fact that Der-
rida was even opposed the award of an honorary degree 
by Cambridge University on the grounds that his work 
consisted of “little more than semi-intelligible attacks 
upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship”. For 
a tradition of philosophy that prides itself on its “clarity 
and rigour”, the values supposed to be at risk to Derri-
da’s “tricks and gimmicks” are so intimately bound up 
with the referential relation as the essence of language. 
More importantly perhaps, such a view of language runs 
the risk of losing sight of humanity and ethics altogether.
6  Albert Doja, 2006b.9
Another indirect clue, at least on the significance of 
Derrida’s challenge to Lévi-Strauss’s contribution could 
be offered by comparing a personal opinion put forward 
by Carlo Ginzburg. We know the parallels between his 
study of micro-history and the structural analysis of the 
past. But the Friulan miller Menocchio, the colourful pro-
tagonist of his perhaps most known book Il formaggio e 
i vermi (1976), whom Ginzburg attempted to define as 
an example of traditional peasant culture, may evoke a 
number of parallels with the “savage mind” of the people 
to whom Lévi-Strauss is bound by elective affinity. Now 
Ginzburg, as he confessed in an interview in 1986, is not 
interested “in having professional readers”, but read-
ers who might read exactly in the way Menocchio read 
books, even though he is paradoxically perhaps “deeply 
interested in catching the right meaning of a text”. But 
like Lévi-Strauss, for him too, “that kind of creative mis-
reading is the only way of reading”, while he is “deeply 
against every kind of Derrida trash, that kind of cheap 
skeptical attitude”, which he considered as “one of the 
cheapest intellectual things going on”7.
At once, Ginzburg is determined “to understand the 
right meaning of a text”, he gives his benevolent approv-
al to readers such as Menocchio to engage in “creative 
misreading”, and he launches a diatribe against Derri-
da’s “skeptical attitude”. How could one reconcile these 
three contradictory positions? Conventionally, if Menoc-
chio and other non-professional or non-literate readers 
should be accorded sympathetic encouragement for their 
creative misreadings or speculative reading bricolages, 
nothing must distinguish these misreadings and bricola-
ges from Derrida’s “tricks and gimmicks”. In other words, 
if we were to look for some grounds on which Ginzburg 
might explain his own persistent quest for “the right 
7  Quoted in Molho, 2004, pp. 12.94
meaning”, we could think of Menocchio as if he were a 
sixteenth-century Derrida or the French philosopher as a 
twentienth-century incarnation of the Friulan miller.
Yet, Ginzburg’s attack on Derrida in 1986 provided no 
ground for appeal. Interestingly, he had used exactly the 
same expression “trash” (spazzatura) when, two years 
before, he referred to German racist propaganda in the 
190s. Categorical in rejecting positions Ginzburg has 
been increasingly anxious to identify those with whom 
he disagreed and whose ethical behaviour he considered 
morally equivocal, unacceptable, and even dangerous8. 
One can then guess why he has been so rigidly critical of 
Jacques Derrida, while cheering on the sixteenth-century 
Friulan miller, despite or because of his misreadings.
Menocchio  is  in  a  sense  one  of  our  forerunners, 
because he is also the dispersed fragment, reaching us by 
chance, of an obscure shadowy world that can be recon-
nected to our own history only by an arbitrary act. That 
culture has been destroyed. To respect its residue of 
unintelligibility that resists any attempt at analysis does 
not mean succumbing to the foolish fascination with the 
exotic and incomprehensible. It is simply taking note of a 
historical mutilation of which, in a certain sense, we our-
selves are the victims9.
By contrast, Derrida, who after all is one of our con-
temporaries, because of his presumed misreadings, is 
tossed to the heap of cultural trash produced by our cul-
ture. There is no more need to point to the moral and 
conceptual neighbourhood between Ginzburg’s and Lévi-
Strauss’s ethics, even though Lévi-Strauss’s reaction to 
Derrida was symmetrically inversed.
8  Molho, 2004, p. 14.
9  Ginzburg, 1976, p. XXV.95
Simply put, Derrida’s distinction between speech and 
writing is unnecessary, and his opposition of grammatolo-
gy to logocentrism is but much ado about nothing. Some 
anthropologists, especially in France, may be ready to 
dismiss Derrida’s discussion of writing as violence, feeling 
it to be no more than the personal preoccupation of one 
of the foremost Parisian intellectual dandies. All the fussy 
logorrhoea is indeed reminiscent of those false celebrities 
that only the Parisian scene could produce… and export. 
In the last analysis, this is nothing else than an arrogant 
scholastics and deliberate misinformation that only igno-
rance or a certain idea of “self-present” grandeur in acad-
emy could allow.
Derrida’s Grammatology (1967) represented an impor-
tant attack on the foundations of structural approach, 
and his “deconstruction”, the best-known or most infa-
mous of postmodernist strategies, has been widely used 
to destabilize anthropological and other assumptions 
about language, writing and meaning. Derrida’s strate-
gy of critical analysis serves to expose underlying meta-
physical assumptions, in particular those which appear 
to contradict the surface argument of the text itself. The 
term has become synonymous with post-modern theo-
ry of various sorts but anthropology has been viewed as 
an arena particularly appropriate to the postmodernist 
agenda, especially with regard to unpacking of some of its 
key terms and concepts such as ‘otherness’ and ‘culture’.
Yet, the “Tristes Tropiques” of post-modernists have 
located in empiricism and historicism a genuine and well-
known problem, mainly by means of a dismissive atti-
tude toward scientific analysis and the largely uncritical 
appropriation of literary criticism10. It is hardly surpris-
ing, therefore, that Derrida’s theories have taken hold 
10  Polier & Roseberry, 1989.96
especially in North American departments of literature, 
while Lévi-Strauss’s contribution goes unrecognized, par-
ticularly in contemporary North American anthropology.
In many ways Derrida’s “deconstruction” became a 
reading technique so popularized that the word “decon-
struction” used to appear routinely in popular magazines 
and even in big-city newspaper advertisements. Grafted 
across the Atlantic from a set of European philosophical 
inquiries onto the terrain of American new criticism, it is 
starting to look more American than French. It is often 
perceived even in Europe as an American brand of theo-
rems, a discourse or a school, which has become known 
as a thoroughly American invention. This, however, does 
not simply make reference to the fact that deconstruc-
tion is an American ‘thing’, but also to the fact that only 
in America is this brand of deconstruction understood as 
a ‘thing’ at all. In other words, it is not only in America 
that something like deconstruction is, but America itself 
is the deconstruction of Europe11.
As a result, it seems there is currently a total mis-
recognition of Lévi-Strauss’s standing especially in con-
temporary North American anthropology, where simply 
speaking he seems to be on the verge of total irrelevance, 
as few practicing cultural anthropologists see themselves 
as at all influenced by his approach. At most, Lévi-Strauss 
is read in the context of the history of anthropology, and 
there he is usually dismissed, ironically for the very rea-
son he must be praised, namely his insistence on scientif-
ic rigour, simply because this concept is become unfortu-
nately quite alien to many American cultural anthropolo-
gists. The result of this situation is less a steady critique 
of Lévi-Strauss than a particularly insouciant neglect. To 
put it bluntly, in the United States or Britain today, fre-
11  Haverkamp, 1995, p. 28.97
quently graduate students of anthropology do not read 
Lévi-Strauss who is even hardly mentioned in graduate 
courses, which is tragically short-sighted for the disci-
pline. In addition, and what seems most dramatically crit-
ical is that most American anthropologists over the last 
three decades don’t even think Lévi-Strauss is important 
enough to be argued with. He is simply ignored in the 
day-to-day practice of a discipline that by and large has 
embraced post-modernism, especially in the last decades 
of the last century.
No wonder there are and should be an increasing 
number of scholars, who have chosen other paths and do 
the work they do without recourse to Lévi-Strauss at all, 
in the wake of new developments in anthropology world-
wide. But this cannot put at stake his contemporary 
relevance and his critical importance for the future, nor 
can this explain the negative trajectory of Lévi-Strauss’s 
reputation, particularly in American cultural anthropol-
ogy. On the contrary, most anthropologists are rather 
unhappy with this situation, and Lévi-Strauss’s theory 
is in fact received in anthropology with more discretion 
and undoubtedly in contrast with the critical reactions 
that the first texts of structural anthropology caused to a 
broad range of censors, more at ease to blame their philo-
sophical presuppositions than to judge their impact in a 
field of knowledge that none really commanded.
Certainly, many anthropologists would now agree that 
Derrida’s deconstructionist project was not one of negat-
ing or demolishing structuralism, but more one of push-
ing structural anthropology to its most radical potential. 
It might also be argued, of course, that since its inception 
in the 1960s, the term ‘deconstruction’ has been so widely 
used and misused in certain forms of critical theoretical 
discourse that what is believed to be the force and com-
plexity of Derrida’s original formulation might have been 98
frequently lost. The problem, however, is rather that Der-
rida’s critique often seems to have served as an excuse for 
many not to read Lévi-Strauss or engage with the highly 
problematic and subtle nature of his thought on its own 
terms. ‘Post-structuralist’ litterateurs, meanwhile, have 
been inspired by this much-read critique, sometimes as 
an absent referent, which is simply taken as the last word 
on Lévi-Strauss and structuralism, and simplistically 
assuming that structural analysis had therefore been 
superseded. To a certain extent, more often than not this 
line of criticism seems to be less a matter of bold argu-
ments against Lévi-Strauss’s theory than a matter of a 
dogmatically anti-structural ideological posture, which 
relies on the received ideas of many ‘lit-crits’ and ‘post-
crits’ alike derived from the excessive coverage of a very 
often unfounded critique.
The point here is not to conflate Derrida’s reading of 
Lévi-Strauss with post-structuralism and postmodern-
ism, which would be an anachronistic misconstruction, to 
the extent that at least the very terms “poststructuralist” 
or “postmodernist” were never used by Derrida. No won-
der there is nevertheless an increasing dissatisfaction and 
impatience with what poststructuralist and postmodern-
ist criticism has become in the wake of Derrida. There are 
many to be annoyed with this situation, and not neces-
sarily among admirers of Lévi-Strauss only. Among many 
commentators who had written quite extensively on Der-
rida and deconstruction a perfect example is undoubted-
ly Christopher Johnson who has used Derrida’s reading 
of the ‘scene of writing’ and his critique of Lévi-Strauss 
in a number of articles and a book-length commentary 
as a working example to explain deconstruction and 
critical theory. Still, what we are told about the approach 
and tenor of Derrida’s grammatological critique of Lévi-
Strauss, which is primarily considered by all accounts 99
a devastating one, and in which Derrida is supposed to 
“convincingly expose the logical inconsistencies and con-
ceptual limitations of Lévi-Strauss’s argument”, is that 
his deconstruction of Lévi-Strauss’s theory of writing, “his 
patient analysis of its different levels and articulations, of 
its rhetorical as well as its conceptual framework”, in its 
first and final intention, is not meant simply to singular-
ize Lévi-Strauss as an instance of inconsistency and error 
nor “to neutralize and dismiss that theory”12.
Indeed, Christopher Johnson also proved to be sub-
sequently one of the few modern critical theorists to take 
Lévi-Strauss seriously. In his most recent book on Lévi-
Strauss’s formative years1, his acknowledgements fin-
ish with a personal tribute to the intellectual inspiration 
Derrida has given to him, as it was in fact his work on 
Derrida which made him interested in Lévi-Strauss in the 
first place. Yet, his attempt was to account for how Lévi-
Strauss came to that pivotal position in the 1960s, at the 
same time questioning, and this is his Derridean inspira-
tion (Johnson, personal communication, rd June 2004), 
some of the central moves in the construction of struc-
tural theory and poststructuralist movement. He actu-
ally succeeded to masterfully account for the construc-
tion of structural theory and in terms of Lévi-Strauss’s 
intellectual universe for the overall theoretical, scientific 
and humanistic coherence of his ‘life-work’. Not surpris-
ingly thereafter, he couldn’t take any more side in the 
debate. He came consciously or unconsciously to relativ-
ize his own position as expressed in his earlier work to 
the extent that one may perceive at least as his relative 
neutrality on this subject, but which now seems in fact 
more sympathetic to Lévi-Strauss than to his previous 
source of inspiration.
12  Johnson, 1997, p. 2.
1  Johnson, 200.100
I showed elsewhere14 that Lévi-Strauss always saw 
himself as working toward a science that could connect 
mind and the world, using his own formidable generaliz-
ing capacity to reduce empirical differences and to reveal 
the commonalities that he believed lay beneath the jum-
ble of surface reality. Thus, his materialist thrust was sim-
ply refocused on “fundamental structures of the human 
mind”, which allowed him to maintain his empirical inter-
ests and by the same token spared him the accusations 
of both idealism and crude materialism. The empirical 
and analytical experience of structural procedures in 
anthropology, in any area that can become the subject 
of philosophical and metaphysical speculation, had the 
advantage of contributing to a “regressive erosion” of all 
taught philosophy15, in such a way as to send the philoso-
phers back to what Nietzsche had already termed their 
“phantasmagorias”. It is ironic that these issues not only 
explain why he maintained his distance from poststruc-
turalist thought; they also clarify how Lévi-Strauss, whose 
ambition was to discover a universal theory of mind, in 
fact at least partially inspired the modern turn toward 
deconstruction and subjectivity, inadvertently paving the 
way for contemporary post-modernism, a movement he 
deeply deplores.
A number of early critiques have already suggested 
that post-modernism in anthropology does not provide 
any new theoretical focus in the development of the 
field16. Despite its trappings of political and intellectual 
radicalism, post-modern anthropology is, in some of its 
assumptions, a depressingly reactionary endeavour. It 
may be perceived as a greater threat, with both tradi-
tional and critical concerns of the field gradually being 
dismantled in the name of a position that everybody is 
14  Doja, 2005, 2006c.
15  Claud Lévi-Strauss, 1971, p. 570 [68].
16  Sangren, 1988; Polier & Roseberry, 1989; Spencer, 1989.101
desperately seeking in the intellectual division of labour 
of the ‘post-modern cultural condition’.
That is why the anthropologist who was once a hero 
now holds more sway over the humanities than his own 
field, which, he fears, has descended into internecine war-
fare. He now considers that anthropologists, for lack of 
academic project, seek to occupy their time in philoso-
phy, psychoanalysis or literature, “running the risk of let-
ting their discipline lose itself into a magma that, lacking 
a positive definition, is rather loosely glossed post-struc-
turalism or post-modernism in the apophatic style of 
theologians”17. In response to the new wave and to the 
“loss of reference marks affecting post-modernist regres-
sion in anthropology”, he actually has retreated from 
making any global claims and has distanced himself from 
the fray. Serene in his faith in the illusion of progress and 
the limits of human knowledge, he increasingly defines 
himself as a synthesist, the individual who brings order 
and coherence to the mass of data generated by field-
work, the intellectual craftsman struggling to discover 
patterns in a recalcitrant world of dizzying uncertainty.
Fortunately, it seems more than anything else a clear- 
deflned theoretical framework by means of a careful com-
bination of Lévi-Straussian structural analysis, cognitive 
commitments, borderland epistemology and the politics 
of agency and practice is now providing an instance in 
which our theoretical understanding of the world can be 
made to progress, along the overarching revival of the 
kind of vigorous theoretical debate that tended to disap- 
pear from the field in the 1980s. In particular, a critical 
understanding of the interplay of ideology and culture 
as political instruments of hegemony and power, which 
seems particularly good at revealing a new and unsus-
17  Claud Lévi-Strauss, 1998, p. 76.102
pected meaning related to unified visions of the inte- 
gration of knowledge, could be pointing toward some 
neglected but potentially vigorous developments in cur-
rent social and anthropological theory that may present 
not only new empirical material and substantive findings, 
but also generate novel conceptual and theoretical syn-
theses to initiate innovative research directions.
Claude Lévi-Strauss's office10
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